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ABSTRACT
With a growing number of images uploaded daily to social media sites, it is essential to understand if
an image can be used to trace its origin. Forensic investigations are focusing on analyzing images that
are uploaded to social media sites resulting in an emphasis on building and validating tools. There
has been a strong focus on understanding active manipulation or tampering techniques and building
tools for analysis. However, research on manipulation is often studied in a vacuum, involving only
one technique at a time. Additionally, less focus has been placed on passive manipulation, which can
occur by simply uploading an image to a social media site. This research plots the path of an image
through multiple social media sites and identifies unique markers in the metadata that can be used
to track the image. Both Facebook and Twitter were utilized on both phone and web applications
to fully understand any differences between direct and secondary uploads. A full metadata analysis
was conducted including histogram and size comparisons. This paper presents several differences
and unique metadata findings that allow image provenance to be traced to an original image. This
includes a review of IPTC, ICC, and EXIF metadata, ICC profile and Color Profile Description,
Encoding Processes, Estimated Quality Values as well as compression ratios. A checklist of variables
is given to guide future evaluations of image provenance.
Keywords: Image Forensics, Metadata Analysis, Image Manipulation, Forensic Intelligence, Provenance, Social Media

1.

INTRODUCTION

low us to validate the information within any
piece of digital media (Pasquini, Amerini, &
Boato, 2021). Digital image forensic techniques
have provided information regarding the origin
and truthfulness of an image as well as information regarding potential manipulation techniques
that have been performed on the image (Bayram,
Avcibas, Sankur, & Memon, 2006). In addition,
research into image manipulation by way of uploading to social media has identified some of the
mechanisms in which specific websites act upon
the images that are uploaded (Moltisanti, Paratore, Battiato, & Saravo, 2015).

On average there are 1.8 billion images uploaded daily to social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Flickr, Snapchat and WhatsApp (Edwards, 2014). Images that are uploaded to social media sites are increasingly used
in forensic investigations resulting in an emphasis on building and validating tools capable of
detecting manipulated images (Fan, Cao, & Kot,
2013).
In recent years, social media has become a hub
for the transmission of viral information and it
has become imperative to build tools that al1

standard and can be found in most commercial
digital cameras, wearable technology and smart
phones (Wallace, 1992). The JPEG encryption
process involves several components and can be
summarized by the following (Iida & Kiya, 2018):

However, there seems to be a gap in understanding if these forensic tools are capable of differentiating between multiple sources of manipulation (Thakur & Rohilla, 2020). Manipulation
techniques appear to be studied in a vacuum,
one at a time, and validation of a tool is deemed
successful only when the manipulation is identified vs. a non manipulated image. It is however
much more realistic to expect multiple forms of
manipulation, thereby opening the possibility of
hiding purposeful manipulation among the artifacts involved in uploading to social media.
Therefore we question if there are quantifiable
measures to ascertain the movement of an image
through social media? Are there specific markers in the metadata that can aid in the tracing of
image provenance during forensic analysis? By
understanding the complete path of a digital image through social media, investigators will be
able to speak to the authenticity of an image as
well as map the sources of intentional and unintentional manipulation.
This paper is organized as follows: Section
2 presents background and current work relevant to digital forensics and social media, Section
3 lays out data creation and feature extraction
used in this analysis and Section 4 presents the
findings of this research effort. Section 5 draws
conclusions and identifies a checklist for metadata analysis. Limitations and potential future
research will also be discussed in Section 4.

2.

1. Color transform from RGB (Red Green
Blue) to YCbCr (Green Blue Red)
2. Dividing an image into consecutive 8x8
blocks
3. Calculating 8x8 Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) coefficients
4. Creating a quantization matrix
5. Applying Huffman coding
Digital forensic research has created a robust
set of techniques to detect active manipulation
or tampering of an image. Types of tampering
involve region duplication, resampling, color filter array artifacts, inconsistencies in camera response function, lighting and shadows, chromatic
aberrations, sensor noise and statistical features
(Farid, 2009). Digital forensics, however, not
only pertains to active manipulations of an image
but also passive manipulations that tend to be
much more benign and cannot be identified using these techniques. For example, the sole act of
uploading an image to the Internet will manipulate and alter the image, and it is extremely valuable to understand if this type of behavior can be
identified (Giudice, Paratore, Moltisanti, & Battiato, 2017). Depending on the privacy settings
on an individuals social network, images that are
uploaded can be browsed and downloaded by any
user of the platform (Sun & Zhou, 2017). Forensic investigations will benefit from having a set
of unique identifiers that can help plot the path
of any image.
Current research in these passive manipulations has identified that the exchangeable image
file format (EXIF) information (Farid, 2009) as
well as components of the JPEG format can be
used to identify how an image might have been
altered. Moltisanti (Moltisanti et al., 2015), focused on Facebook, identified how the DCT coefficient and quantization tables varied based on

RELEVANT RESEARCH

With the growing number of images across a
growing number of social media sites, it is vital
to not only understand the origin of an image
but also its provenance or movements. According to Piva (Piva, 2013) “Doctored images are
appearing with a growing frequency in different
application fields so that ‘seeing is no longer believing’”.
Images stored on the Internet, especially on
social media sites like Facebook and Twitter are
stored as a JPEG image and undergo some form
of compression unique to the social media site
(Caldelli, Becarelli, & Amerini, 2017). JPEG is
the most widely used lossy image compression
2

supports 16 bit color capture, compared to just
8 bit with JPEG (Pathak, 2020). Since all research was completed on Apple products this
setting was not changed but should be revisited
if further research is to include Android, Pixel
or any additional operating systems. The content of the images were not of concern as this
research focuses on the subsequent social media
manipulation of the image and not the content itself. However, care was taken during image capture to insure that all images were unique with
a variety of colors and features to allow for a
complete histogram and color comparison. All
images were taken using automatic settings and
were not edited in any way.

how the image was originally captured and uploaded to social media. Caldelli (Caldelli et al.,
2017) further evaluated the DCT coefficient and
potential differences between Facebook, Twitter
and Flickr by training an ad-hoc classifier to
successfully identify image provenance. In addition, Kee (Kee, Johnson, & Farid, 2011) identified quantization tables that Flickr frequently
utilized while searching for a data set of images
for JPEG header analysis.
Additional work in the digital forensics research field can be found in a parallel research
group focused on OSINT (Open Source Intelligence). Image analysis techniques include focus
on the hexadecimal file signature (Nixintel, n.d.)
as well as IPTC metadata (IPTC, 2019) and geolocation, which uses features in an image to pin
point the location the image was taken. Even
though these techniques are often used to identify a location or a set of features, the combination of JPEG format components, headers and
IPTC metadata should allow us to identify a set
of variables that are unique to specific social media sites.

3.

3.2

There is a variety of information that can be
found in EXIF metadata and can be broken up
into five main categories: primary, EXIF, Interoperability, thumbnail and GPS (Kee et al.,
2011). As it is unknown how different social media sites will handle the metadata all categories
were included in the initial data capture.
Data collection and analysis was conducted on
an Apple M1 iMac (11.5.1). Even though Apple offers some easy to use and free image software, all images were analyzed using XnView
MP (0.99.1). Below is a list of metadata categories that XnView MP displays per image.

METHODOLOGY

This research focused on mapping how initial as
well as consecutive uploads to a social media site
results in passive image manipulation. The goal
is to identify differences that are unique and that
would assist forensic investigators in identifying
how an image might have moved through social
media.

3.1

Feature Extraction

• General file properties
• JFIF properties

Image Creation

• Histogram

With the prevalence of camera phones and quick
access to social media through the same mobile
device, it is imperative to understand the differences, if any, between media creation on a mobile phone application and desktop web application. All images were captured using an iPhone
13 Pro (iOS 15.1.1) and saved as as an HEIF
(High Efficiency Image Format). Image settings
can be changed to ‘Most Compatible’ resulting
in images being saved in JPEG format, but this
setting was not changed for this research. In
addition, within the Apple ecosystem, HEIF is
superior to JPEG as it takes up less space and

• IPTC-IIM
• Full ICC Profile
In addition, the color histogram and luminance profile were compared between the original
and social media site downloads.

3.3

Social Media Upload & Download

This research was conducted on Facebook and
Twitter as they both have mobile and desktop
functionality and are major social media sharing
sites. While apps like WhatsApp and Youtube
3

Properties, Ratio, Size and Created Date for all
eight images (No. 0-7) and the original image
(No. 8). Note that the dataset generated and
used in this study is available upon request.
An MPF or Multi Picture Format section was
present in several of the ten original images. This
is due to when an image is taken in portrait
mode on a current iPhone an auxiliary photo is
included in the JPG file that provides a disparity
map. This disparity map is stored in an XMP
format and hosts camera depth parameters for
the image. Even though this MPF format can
be found in the metadata for the original image, this information is scrubbed when uploaded
to any social media site both on phone and web
applications. Several other groups of metadata
are also scrubbed when uploaded to social media
sites including specific camera model and lens information, image and component configurations,
as well as GPS data.

see a large number of daily traffic, they are out of
scope as either pure video media content or chat
sites. This research focused on how an image
circulates social media in a public, large audience
environment, not person to person, but is noted
for future research.
Instagram is owned by Facebook, with a much
heavier focus on image sharing, but operates in
very similar manner. File name creation, for example, is identical between the two. Unfortunately, Instagram can only be used on mobile
devices to upload images, whereas the web application on computer has read and like functionality only. The biggest limitation regarding
this research specifically is that Instagram does
not allow for image download on either mobile or
web applications. Secondary websites do provide
this feature but would add additional unknown
variables into this research. Therefore Instagram
was not included as a Social Media variable in
this research.
Fig. 1 depicts the process of data creation.
After the images were captured on the iPhone
the original images were uploaded to the corresponding social media sites through the native
phone application as well as the web application.
Note that, we use the terms “on computer” and
“web application” interchangeably. Once the images were downloaded, they were uploaded and
once again downloaded from the second site. All
images were saved with their original file name,
unique to the social media site, as well as a suffix
to indicate their path, per Table 1.
Ten original images were taken on the iPhone
and then uploaded and downloaded accordingly.
This results in a total data set of ninety images,
ten original with 8 variances of each. All ninety
images were examined and all metadata was tabulated manually. Histogram analysis was conducted through screenshots by comparing ratios
of the Red, Blue and Green distributions as well
as the luminance.

4.

4.1

Differences in Metadata

Fig. 2 identifies several variables in the metadata
that seem to differ between uploading through
web or phone applications as well as between
the different social media sites. The original
image consists of ICC information which is retained on web applications as well as EXIF information which is completely scrubbed from
all images. However, when image upload and
download occur through the phone application,
EXIF information is always retained. A defining differentiator appears to be what metadata
is scrubbed. A direct download to Twitter retains ICC and IPTC data, however a subsequent
upload to Facebook scrubs that data. In comparison a direct upload to Facebook retains IPTC
data, which is then scrubbed when uploaded to
Twitter.
Twitter appears to be the only social media
site to retain the original Color Profile Description on both computer and phone uploads. For
example, Display P3, can only be found in the
original image and direct Twitter uploads on
both phone and web applications. Direct as well
as secondary Facebook uploads through the web
application appears to modify this data point to
uRGB, whereas mobile applications scrub this

RESULTS

Analysis of the data set was run through XnView
MP and the main results can be seen in Fig.
2. The screenshot summarizes the Name, Info,
4

Figure 1: Process flow for data creation.
Table 1: Suffix Assignment for Data Set Naming Methodology

Phone
Computer

Twitter (T)
Tp
Tc

Facebook (F)
Fp
Fc

data point entirely. Similarly, within the ICC
profile, the Profile Type, Manufacturer and Profile Copyright seem to only be retained by a direct upload to Twitter. Facebook modifies this
data point in its web application to Unknown
and completely scrubs this data point on mobile
applications.
File Permissions do not seem to identify type
of social media, however, read and write permissions differ based on web versus phone application. Images saved from the phone application
only retain owner read and write permissions
(rw−−−−−−−) compared to images saved from
the web applications (rw-r−−r−−).

4.2

T→
− F
TFp
TFc

F→
− T
FTp
FTc

as the EXIFTool properties for all images. Even
though the original image utilizes Baseline DCT
and Huffman coding, Twitter uniquely substitutes Progressive DCT coding in place of Baseline DCT for direct Twitter as well as F-T uploads. This can be seen on all web application
downloads, and specifically only on F-T uploads
through the phone application. Direct Twitter
uploads on a phone retain Baseline DCT coding.
All direct Facebook as well as T-F uploads retain
Baseline DCT coding for its encoding process.
The Current IPTC Digest is a unique data
point found only in images downloaded from
phone applications and is based on the MD5 hash
of any legacy IPTC-IIM values. Within XnView
MP this value is identified under the header Photoshop and indicates that both the Twitter and
Facebook phone applications apply some level

Unique Metadata

Information regarding the encoding process can
be found both in the image properties as well
5

Figure 2: XnView MP metadata results for original image and 8 variances.
image. Similarly, Twitter will override this value
both on a direct upload as well as on the image uploaded from Facebook. Table 2 summarizes the Estimated Quality of an image value
for all 8 images compared to the original image
(IMG 0017.JPEG), which is 93.
Image compression on both web and phone applications appears to also allow social media differentiation. Through its web application, images that are directly uploaded to Twitter retain the dimensions of the original image. Facebook, however, implements a 50% compression
ratio. Additionally, an image uploaded to Twitter from Facebook retains the Facebook compression. The Twitter web application tends to
retain the metadata in an image rather than substituting its own. In comparison, a direct upload
to Twitter on a phone implements a compression ratio of around 63% whereas Facebook implements a ratio of 51% close to the 50% seen
through the web application. A subsequent upload to Twitter does not seem to implement any
additional compression, whereas Facebook will
implement a further compression to the image
uploaded from Twitter, for a final compression
ratio of 51%. Again, close to the 50% compression ratio seen in the web application. Table 3
summarizes the image sizes for all 8 images compared to the original image size of 3024x4032.
Fig. 3 compares the RGB and Luminance
Histograms for all eight images to the original file (Image 0). Subtle differences between
the histograms can identify the source (phone
vs. web application) as well as social media
site (F, T, F →
− T, T →
− F ). Direct uploads to
Twitter using both a phone and web application match the original histogram well. A direct upload to Facebook using a phone results

of photo editing to an image even if the user
does not specify edits during the upload. It is
also noted that the value for the IPTC Digest
reads d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e for all
images, regardless of source. This MD5 hash
value is unique and known to be an empty hash
string (a NULL character). Regarding future research, there is some value in identifying if different types of image editing result in unique hash
values.
An additional section of metadata that is
unique to images downloaded from phone applications is Thumbnail and Compression metadata. However, there does not seem to be
any differentiating factors regarding social media within this data set.

4.3

Image Size & Histograms

One component of the Image Properties, the Estimated Quality of an image, appears to be the
best identifier to the source of an image. If an
image is uploaded to Twitter through the web
application the estimated quality will match the
original image and if an image is uploaded from
Facebook to Twitter, through the web application, Twitter will match the value assigned by
Facebook. Essentially, Twitter does not specify
its own estimated quality in the web application,
it accepts whichever value had already been specified, be it from the original image or a previous
social media site.
However, when images are uploaded on the
phone application Facebook assigns an estimated
quality that matches the original image, regardless of the source. Therefore, an image downloaded first to Twitter, and assigned a lower estimated quality, will be overridden by Facebook
with the estimated quality value of the original
6

Table 2: Estimated Quality of an Image on Phone and Web Applications

Phone
Computer

Twitter (T)
85
93

Facebook (F)
93
86

T→
− F
93
85

F→
− T
85
86

Table 3: Image Size Compression on Phone and Web Applications

Phone
Computer

Twitter (T)
1898x2532
3024x4032

Facebook (F)
1536x2048
1512x2016

F→
− T
1536x2048
1512x2016

be used as a basic strategy when analyzing an
image. First, identify what type of metadata an
image contains, namely ICC, EXIF, IPTC, etc.
Twitter will retain much of this, whereas Facebook only retains IPTC and EXIF data. Second, check the Color Profile Description as well
as the ICC profile. An Unknown value identifies
a Facebook edit to the metadata, whereas original device information indicates Twitter. Third,
within the EXIFTool properties, the encoding
process tends to be Baseline DCT in original
images and Facebook sources, whereas Twitter
implements Progressive DCT encoding. Fourth,
find the Estimated Quality value and calculate
the image compression ratio. Facebook applies
a 50% compression ratio on both web and phone
applications whereas Twitter tends to utilize images in their original size on web applications and
at 63% compression on phone applications. Also
note, that metadata information like file permissions, Current IPTC Digest and Thumbnail data
can identify if a web or phone application was
used to share the image in question.

in a choppier and stepped histogram, which can
be seen in the multiple choppy peaks in both the
red and blue histograms. Direct uploads to Facebook using a web application retains the overall
shape of the histogram but tends to sharpen its
peaks. As seen with some of the other variables
discussed, Twitter tends to keep features regardless of source, therefore, an upload to Twitter
from Facebook results in the histogram matching that of the histogram from Facebook. This
can be seen both on phone and web applications.
Facebook, however, will edit the image uploaded
from Twitter, resulting in a more choppy histogram.

5.

T→
− F
1534x2048
1512x2016

DISCUSSION

This in-depth metadata analysis presents several
unique identifiers that can be utilized to understand how an image might have traveled through
social media. It is important to note that even
though an original image is not always available
for analysis, there are multiple investigative scenarios where a comparison is crucial. A recent
increase in revenge porn investigations for example will find it extremely useful to be able to track
how an image was wrongfully shared. In these
cases, as well as fraud examinations for example,
an original would be available for comparative
analysis.
This analysis shows that metadata within an
image can tell us a lot about how an image has
traveled through social media. The following can

5.1

Limitations & Future Research

As this research was focused on the Apple ecosystem it is crucial to extend this methodology to
Android applications. As the original image on
the iPhone is not a JPEG, and has specific metadata variables unique to Apple it would be beneficial to compare this process between Apple and
Android.
7

Figure 3: Histogram comparison between Original and Image 1 - 8 per process flow.
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